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[Tihe line is often very thin between the cases in which the Court felt compelled to abstain from adjudication because of their "political" nature, and the
cases that so frequently arise in applying the concepts of "liberty" and
"equality."1

I.

INTRODUCTION

The power to interpret the Constitution is not vested solely in the
judicial branch. Although Marbury v. Madison2 has been used to assert the preeminence of judicial review and elevate the judiciary to the
status of "ultimate interpreter of the Constitution,"3 the Framers anticipated that all branches would have a "concurrent right to expound
the [C]onstitution."4 This decision left room for judicial deference to
the political branches. However, the judicial branch wields a potent
weapon in the exercise of its authority as the courts alone determine
when they should defer to another branch or exercise judicial review.
The thin line between judicial deference and judicial review is manned
exclusively by the justices of the courts.
The political question doctrine is one of the methods for abstaining
from the exercise of judicial review. Like other justiciability doctrines
such as standing, ripeness, or mootness, the political question doctrine
provides the courts with a means to avoid deciding a case on its merits. Although the doctrine was originally tied exclusively to the text of
the Constitution, the current doctrine has evolved into two different
strands: the classical version and the prudential version. 5 The original, or classical strand, is tied to the determination of whether an issue has been committed to another branch of government or whether
an act of another branch exceeds the authority committed to that
branch. 6 The prudential strand, on the other hand, suggests that the
courts should abstain from judicial review in order to protect the
courts' legitimacy, to circumvent legitimizing a questionable policy
choice by another branch, and to avoid disputes with the political
branches.7 The ostensible purpose of both the classical strand and the
prudential strand of the doctrine is to provide the courts with methods
1. Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARv. L. REV.
217, 227-28 (1955).
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
4. JAMES MADISON, Letters of Helvidius No. 11 (1793), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 138, 155 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
5. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, JudicialReview and the PoliticalQuestion, 79 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1031, 1039-45 (1985) (differentiating the classical version and the prudential version of the doctrine); Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A FunctionalAnalysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966).
6. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
7. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 71, 194 (2d ed. 1986).
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for avoiding a decision on the merits of the case, albeit for different
purposes.
Although the political question doctrine was fully explicated by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr8 almost fifty years ago, the Nebraska Supreme Court first made use of the doctrine in Nebraska Coalition for Educational Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman in 2007.9 In
Coalition, the Nebraska Supreme Court addressed a constitutional
challenge to the adequacy of Nebraska's funding system for education,
holding that the challenge was a non-justiciable political question
under four of the criteria articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Baker.1O In an attempt to avoid a decision on the merits of the case,
the Nebraska Supreme Court sought to resurrect the political question doctrine in its entirety.
The decision in Coalition emphasized that the political question
doctrine, in its current diminished state, rarely shields the courts from
determining the merits of the case. The status of the doctrine can be
attributed to three factors. First, since Baker, the use of the doctrine
by the U.S. Supreme Court has steadily declined.11 The Court has
found a political question in only three cases and has limited its discussion of the doctrine to the first two Baker criteria. 12 Second, the
first two criteria, which have been tied principally to the classical
strand of the doctrine, have been criticized as a thinly veiled attempt
to mask the Court's decision on the merits of the case. Although the
remaining prudential considerations stated in Coalition do present viable arguments for finding a non-justiciable political question, the use
of prudential considerations after a decision has been made on the
merits of the case is superfluous given that the purpose of the doctrine
is already thwarted. Third, the courts are increasingly more confident
in asserting judicial authority in regard to interpretation of a variety
of issues, to the detriment of the doctrine.
In order to explain the manner in which the political question doctrine produced a decision on the merits in Coalition, this Note proceeds in three stages. Part II provides the historical background of
the political question doctrine, the creation of the Baker criteria, and
the aftermath of the Baker decision. Part III analyzes the Nebraska
Supreme Court's decision in Coalition and evaluates the utilization of
the classical and prudential versions of the doctrine. Part IV con8. 369 U.S. 186.
9. 273 Neb. 531, 731 N.W.2d 164 (2007).
10. Id. The Baker criteria are detailed in full in section II.B., infra.
11. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237,

263-67 (2002).
12. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224
(1993); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
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cludes the preceding analysis with a brief discussion on the prospects
for future usage of the political question doctrine.
II.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Political Question Doctrine

The political question doctrine rests on the premise that some constitutional questions are outside the scope of judicial review. Similar
to other justiciability doctrines, such as standing, mootness, or ripeness, 13 the doctrine allows the judicial branch to avoid a substantive
decision on the merits of the case. 14 In determining whether a political question exists, the courts make a threshold determination of
whether a matter has been constitutionally committed to another
branch, or whether an action by a coordinate branch surpasses the
authority committed to that branch. 15 Thus, the court's decision does
not address whether there has been a violation of the constitutionwhich is a substantive decision-but acknowledges that a constitutional provision may be "entrusted exclusively and finally to the political branches of government for 'self-monitoring'"-which is a
procedural decision. 16 This distinction between substantive and procedural decisions can be traced back to the constitutional foundations
of the United States.
1.

ConcurrentRights and Constitutional Interpretation

In arguing for the ratification of the Constitution, James Madison
wrote that all departments-the branches of government-had a "concurrent right to expound the [Clonstitution"17 and were coequal in
"their respective powers."ls However, Madison recognized that "the
exposition of the laws and Constitution devolves upon the Judiciary."19 Madison's acquiescence was based, in part, on the assumption
that constitutional review would be rare and that the judiciary would
13. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (listing the doctrines of standing,
mootness, ripeness, and political questions as representing prudential considerations used by the judiciary).
14. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 457-58 (1992).
15. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
16. Louis Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 599
(1976); see also Redish, supra note 5, at 1048-49 (defining substantive deference
as the courts' willingness to defer to the expertise of the executive and legislative
branches while retaining the final authority to determine constitutional limits
and defining procedural deference as the courts' recognition of the inappropriateness of judicial review because an issue is linked exclusively to another branch).
17. MADISON, supra note 4, at 138, 155.
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 282 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
19. Maeva Marcus, JudicialReview in the Early Republic, in LAUNCHING THE "ExTENDED REPUBLIC": THE FEDERALIST ERA 25, 31 (Ronald Hoffman & Peter J. Albert eds., 1996).
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serve as a check against "unwise and unjust measures" and the "tendency in the [1legislature to absorb all power into its vortex." 20 Alexander Hamilton posited a more distinct argument in regard to judicial
review, contending that the courts would serve as an intermediary between the people and the legislature in order to "keep the latter within
the limits assigned to their authority."2 1 The "natural presumption"
was that the legislature could not determine its own power unless
there was a particular constitutional provision specifying otherwise. 22
Hamilton's argument hit upon the distinction central to the classical
political question doctrine-that "[tihe interpretation of the laws is
the proper and peculiar province of the courts."23 The rule is preempted only if a provision of the Constitution grants otherwise.
2.

The Effect of Marbury v. Madison

Although Marbury v. Madison24 has come to represent the inception of judicial review, Chief Justice Marshall also advanced the far
more pedestrian proposition that political questions are different from
legal questions. 25 Marshall argued that political questions "respect
the nation, not individual rights."26 Therefore, political questions, not
surprisingly, should be examined politically. However, an individual
may resort to the courts for satisfaction in instances "where a specific
duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty."27 This distinction emphasized the idea that
some questions are not proper for judicial review as well as the growing assumption that laws pertaining to individual rights "belonged exclusively to the courts."2 s Although Marshall could not articulate
where the distinction lay between political questions and legal questions, he asserted that "[i]f some acts be examinable, and others not,
there must be some rule of law to guide the court in the exercise of its
20.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

26.
27.
28.

59 (1989)
(arguing that the Framers of the Constitution were particularly concerned with
implementing institutional protections against the power of the legislature given
their experience with the British Parliament and the American legislatures).
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 435 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1999).
Id.
Id.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Deference to the legislature was still the norm during the Marshall Court; the
Marbury decision would not gain significance until the middle of the twentieth
century with the rise of the Warren Court. CLINTON, supra note 20, at 102-09,
121-27.
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166.
Id.
Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of JudicialReview Revisited, or How the Marshall
ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

Court Made More out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 787, 807 (1999).
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jurisdiction."2 9 This decision carries additional gravitas due to the
fact that Marshall, and the early Court in general, deferred to the political branches' judgment to a far greater degree than the courts today. 30 For instance, in Martin v. Mott, the Court held that the
President had the exclusive authority to determine when to call the
militia and, consequently, that his authority was not subject to judicial review. 3 1 The decision in Martin was indicative of the general
deference afforded to the political branches and helped establish general categories that were considered inappropriate for judicial review. 32 Thus, when dealing with a political question, a court was to
examine the view of the political branches and apply that view so that
the "expressed view of the political department becomes a rule of decision for the court."33 By the early twentieth century, the Court had
applied this rationale to constitutional questions in cases involving
the Guarantee Clause, the enactment of statues, constitutional enactments, the duration of a state of war, international boundaries, and
foreign policy. 34
3.

The Development of PrudentialConsiderations

Central to the doctrine's development was the proliferation of prudential considerations in the decisions of the Court. In reviewing
classical political questions, the Court increasingly turned to considerations outside the text of the Constitution in abdicating judicial review. 35 Prudential considerations played a critical role in the Court's
decision-making process, even in the application of the classical version of the doctrine. For instance, in Luther v. Borden,36 the Court
faced the issue of determining whether the charter government of
Rhode Island complied with the Guarantee Clause.3 7 Invoking the
classical formulation of the political question doctrine, the Court
found that the Guarantee Clause vested final authority with Con29. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165.
30. Barkow, supra note 11, at 250-53.
31. 25 U.S. 19 (1827). Congress had delegated a portion of its authority under Article
I, Section 8, Clause 15 of the U.S. Constitution to the President in a 1785 act. Id.
at 29.
32. See Oliver P. Field, The Doctrine of PoliticalQuestions in the Federal Courts, 8
MINN. L. REV. 485 (1924).
33. Id. at 485.
34. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 192-97 (1953).
35. Redish, supra note 5, at 1043.
36. 48 U.S. 1, 46 (1849).
37. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (stating that "[t]he United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect
each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic
Violence").
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gress, stating that "its decision is binding on every other department
of the government, and could not be questioned in a judicial tribunal." 38 However, prudential considerations clearly played some role
in the decision, as Chief Justice Taney articulated numerous consequences stemming from invalidating the Rhode Island government
and its actions since inception.39 Similarly, when the Court faced the
same issue in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon,
Chief Justice White minutely detailed the practical, undesirable consequences of deciding the issue on the merits, instead of simply relying on Luther or constitutional language.40
Following President Roosevelt's proposed Court-packing bill,41 the
Court used prudential rationales outlined in Luther and Pacific States
as justification to defer to Congress in regard to New Deal legislation42 and thereby further expanded the prudential strand of the doctrine. 4 3 For instance, in Coleman v. Miller, Chief Justice Hughes
found that the Court could not determine how long a constitutional
amendment's proposal could be left open for ratification.44 Therefore,
until Congress proposed the limits for amendment ratification, the
Court lacked the authority to review the issue on its merits or to establish these limits themselves.45 Prudential considerations, such as
those used in Coleman, thereafter became commonplace.46
Alexander Bickel, perhaps the most well-known advocate of the
prudential approach, argued that the political question doctrine provides a means to maintain the courts' legitimacy and to ensure that
the courts have the opportunity for principled decision-making at the
appropriate time.4 7 Bickel argued that techniques for not deciding a
case on its merits "allow leeway to expediency without abandoning
principle."48 If there is no judicial review on the merits, no check on
38.
39.
40.
41.

Luther, 48 U.S. at 42.
Id. at 38-39.
223 U.S. 118, 141-42 (1912).
In 1937, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed legislation that, among
other things, would have allowed the President to appoint a new justice for each
justice over the age of seventy. The legislation-the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1937-was a response to numerous Supreme Court decisions during that
time overturning Roosevelt's New Deal legislation. The Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1937 is commonly referred to as the Court-packing bill. See Barry
Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201, 208-10 (1994).
42. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT

213-28 (1995).

43. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552-56 (1946) (holding that the Court
lacked the ability to remap the Illinois districts and that any failure by Congress
to address a failure in representation was to be addressed by the people).

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

307 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1939).
Id.
See, e.g., Redish, supra note 5, at 1037-39.
BICKEL, supra note 7, at 71.
Id.
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political action, and no legitimization of existing policies in regard to
an issue, then the courts have the opportunity to "elicit partial answers and reactions from the other institutions, and to try tentative
answers itself."4 9 For instance, in the decade prior to Bickel's writing,
the Court had adhered to the principle that the "races must not be
segregated by authority of the state."50 However, Bickel argued that
the Court's dismissal of Naim v. Naim5 ' was a prudent choice given
the recent decision in Brown v. Board of Education,5 2 which furthered
the principle of integration. 5 3 For Bickel, uncompromising adherence
to principle was unpalatable for society, and methods for circumventing judicial action were not only wise but also reflected the discretion normally utilized by the courts. 54 Thus, for advocates of the
prudential version of the political question doctrine, the courts' discretion in invoking the doctrine, when compared to the general act of constitutional interpretation, is "something greatly more flexible."55
Bickel's argument flew in the face of advocates of the classical political question doctrine, such as Herbert Wechsler, who argued that
the most the doctrine could possibly infer was that the courts must
determine whether the issue was constitutionally committed to another branch of government. 5 6 For Wechsler, the political question
doctrine represented nothing more than a normal exercise of judicial
review, using the "standards that should govern the interpretive process generally." 57 The caveat to Wechsler's argument was that the
only proper reason for abstaining from judicial review was that the
"autonomous determination" of the issue rested with another
branch.58 The judicial process, including the political question doctrine, needed to be genuinely principled, "transcending the immediate
result that is achieved," regardless of the consequences of that decision. 59 Unlike Bickel, Wechsler argued that the duty of the courts to
interpret the Constitution does not grant the courts the "discretion to
49. Id. at 194, 240.
50. Id. at 240.
51. 90 S.E.2d 849 (1956). The issue in Naim was the constitutionality of an antimiscegenation statute. BICKEL, supra note 7, at 174.
52. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (finding the segregation of educational facilities to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution).
53. BICKEL,supra note 7, at 174.
54. Id. at 64, 125-26. Bickel cites the denial of certiorari and dismissal of appeals as
two common methods of avoiding judicial review.
55. Id. at 125-26.
56. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HAav.L.
REV. 1, 7-8 (1959).
57. Id. at 9.
58. Id. at 7-8.
59. Id. at 15.
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abstain or intervene" at will.60 Thus, the prudential strand of the doc-

trine only opened the door to decisions based on considerations outside
the Constitution. 6 1 The controversy between Bickel and Wechsler
centered primarily on the basis on which the political question doctrine is invoked and, ultimately, the method necessary to achieve principled decision-making. It was within the context of this debate that
the Court decided Baker v. Carr, creating a principled structure for
evaluating the application of the doctrine that would eventually result
in the diminution of prudential considerations altogether. 62
B. Baker v. Carr- Creating the Criteria
In 1962, the Warren Court addressed the justiciability of a suit alleging that a state apportionment statute violated the Equal Protection Clause in Baker v. Carr.63 In finding the issue justiciable and,
thus, reviewable on its merits, Justice Brennan catalogued numerous
cases that encapsulated the characteristics that placed an issue under
the doctrine's "umbrella."64 These six characteristics, which independently indicate the presence of a political question, are
[a]textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable

standards for resolving it; or the determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifari65
ous pronouncements by various departments on one question.

The court found that one of these criteria must be present in order for
the court to abdicate judicial review.6 6
In extracting the doctrine's characteristics, the Court emphasized
that the doctrine is "primarily a function of the separation of powers."67 As such, the doctrine involves a "delicate exercise in constitu-

tional interpretation" to determine whether a matter has been
committed to another branch or whether an action by a coordinate
branch surpasses the authority committed to that branch; this reflects
60. Id. at 9.
61. Id.
62. See Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability:The Transformation and Disappearanceof the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV.

1203, 1204-05 (2002); Barkow, supra note 11, at 265-67.
63. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
64. Id. at 226. Brennan's review of previous political question cases included issues
addressing foreign relations, dates of duration of hostilities, validity of enactments, the status of Indian tribes, and republican forms of government.
65. Id. at 217.
66. Id.

67. Id. at 210.
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the classical version of the doctrine. 68 Referring back to Coleman v.
Miller, the Court also stated that dominant considerations in determining if there is a political question included the finality of the actions of the political department and the presence of satisfactory
criteria for the judicial determination; these criteria are tied to the
prudential version of the doctrine. 6 9 Correspondingly, the first two
Baker criteria have been considered the classical factors, and the remaining four criteria have been identified with the prudential factors.7 0 Baker wove the classical and prudential strands of the doctrine
together in a cohesive legal standard that appeared, on the surface, to
provide the courts with flexibility in utilizing the doctrine. 71 Shortly
after Baker was decided, Bickel stated that the point of Baker was,
"not what function the Court is to perform in legislative apportionment..., but whether it can play any role at all." 72 Despite this optimism, the decision would eventually mark the decline of the
3
doctrine.7
The Court's decision in Baker, as well as its subsequent decision in
Powell v. McCormack,74 led some to believe that the political question
doctrine was in jeopardy due to the expansive view of judicial review
in these cases. 75 Whatever the intentions of the Court were in articulating the Baker criteria, the years following the case only saw three
instances in which the Court found a political question.76 In addition,
analysis under the Baker criteria has been limited almost exclusively
to the classical aspects of the doctrine.77
C.

Baker's Aftermath
1. Developing the Baker Criteria

Following Baker, the Court began to develop the meaning of the
decision's criteria. However, there was a marked tendency to evaluate
only the first two criteria-whether there was a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political de68. Id. at 211. In this section of the opinion, Brennan refers to the Court as the
.ultimate interpreter of the Constitution," indicating the Warren Court's shift
away from the foundational concept of joint interpretive power.
69. Id. at 210; see also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939).
70. See Barkow, supra note 11, at 265.
71. See Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the
Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 643, 646-47 (1989).
72. BICKEL, supra note 7, at 196.
73. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 62, at 1208.
74. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
75. Nagel, supra note 71, at 647 (citing PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 235 (2d ed. 1973)).
76. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224
(1993); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
77. See Nixon, 506 U.S. 224; Gilligan,413 U.S. 1.
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partment; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it."78 For instance, in Nixon v. United States,
Chief Justice Rehnquist listed only the first two Baker criteria as relevant to the Court's analysis and restricted the discussion to the textual meaning of the Impeachment Clause. 79 Furthermore, following
Powell v. McCormack, the Court no longer delved into an analysis of
the Baker criteria when a matter was justiciable, but instead simply
denied the applicability of the doctrine.S0 Although the Court would
make some mention of concerns relating to the prudential criteria
listed in Baker, in no case were these criteria the determining factors.8 1 In fact, the Court would state that the Baker criteria were
"probably listed in descending order of both importance and certainty."82 Thus, the primary emphasis in evaluating whether the political question doctrine is applicable in a case has been on the first
two elements.
In evaluating whether there is a textual commitment to another
branch, the Court has held that the text in question must be interpreted in order to determine to what extent the issue is textually committed to another branch or, in other words, the scope of that branch's
authority.8 3 As noted by Justice White,
the issue in the political question doctrine is not whether the constitutional
text commits exclusive responsibility for a particular governmental function
to one of the political branches ....Rather, the issue is whether the Constitution has given one of the political branches
final responsibility for interpreting
84
the scope and nature of such a power.

The fact that the text names one department as having the responsibility to carry out a function does not necessarily mean that the provision is beyond judicial review on the merits.
For instance, in Powell v. McCormack, the Court addressed the issue of whether Congress had the final say in determining the qualifications of its members. 8 5 Despite a broad, constitutional grant of
78. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see also Vieth, 541 U.S. 267 (concluding
"that political gerrymandering claims are non-justiciable because no judicially
discernable and manageable standards for adjudicating such claims exist");
Nixon, 506 U.S. 224 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217); Goldwater v. Carter, 444
U.S. 996 (1979) (adhering strictly to the classical political question doctrine, with
a plurality of the Court finding that constitutional silence left the issue of
whether the President could abrogate a treaty without Senate approval up to the
political branches); Powell, 395 U.S. 486 (also quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
79. 506 U.S. at 238.
80. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 456-59 (1992); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
81. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 390 (1990); Japan Whaling
Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
82. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278.
83. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228-29; Powell, 395 U.S. at 519-20.
84. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 240 (White, J., concurring).
85. 395 U.S. 486.
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authority to Congress, 8 6 the Court found that the textual commitment
was restricted by "the standing qualifications prescribed in the Constitution."8 7 In turn, the Court reviewed the case on its merits, determining that Congress had acted outside of its proscribed
constitutional authority.8 8 Similarly, in INS v. Chadha, the textual
commitment to Congress to establish a "Rule of Naturalization" did
not prohibit the Court from reviewing whether Congress had chosen a
"constitutionally permissible means of implementing that power."8 9
From these decisions, it does not seem that the first Baker criterion is
determined by a textual commitment allocating responsibility of a
government function to another branch. The Constitution rarely, if
ever, explicitly commits final responsibility of the interpretation of a
provision to a particular department. Instead, a political question
must be inferred from the text and structure of the Constitution.90
Analysis of the first criterion has varied in instances where the
Court has applied the political question doctrine. In Gilligan v. Morgan, which challenged the appropriateness of training and weaponry
of the Ohio National Guard, the Court refused to assume the responsibility of another department's function of continuing surveillance over
the National Guard based on the textual commitment of the issue to
Congress. 9 1 The Court did not need to analyze the textual commitment of the provision because the plaintiffs sought to have the Court
take over the function of training the National Guard, which is a function for the political branches. In connection, the Court stated that
the decision did not "hold nor imply that the conduct of the National
Guard is always beyond judicial review or that there may not be accountability in a judicial forum for violations of law for specific unlawful conduct by military personnel." 92 However, in Nixon, the Court
faced a quite different issue of whether the process used by the Senate
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl.1 ("Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections,
Returns and Qualifications of its own Members.").
87. Powell, 395 U.S. at 550. The qualifications include those set out in art. I, § 2, cl.
2; art. I, § 3, cl.7; art. I, § 6, cl.
2; and § 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment-none of
which deemed Powell ineligible. Id. at 521.
88. Id. at 519-50.
89. 462 U.S. 919, 940-41 (1983).
90. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 240 (1993) (White, J., concurring); see also
Redish, supra note 5, at 1042-43 (noting that whether the court's review role is
expressly referenced in the text of the constitutional provision is irrelevant because judicial review is never mentioned in the Constitution).
91. 413 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1973); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.16 (giving Congress
the power to "provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United
States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and
the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress").

92. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 11-12.
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in impeachment trials complied with the Constitution. 9 3 Thus, the
Court was evaluating whether a legislative action abided by the Constitution. After an extensive review of the meaning of the words "sole"
and "try," as well as the "historical and contemporary understanding
of the impeachment provisions," Justice Rehnquist's decision turned
on the fact that there was no textual limit on the word "try."9 4 The
Senate procedures for trying Judge Nixon did not "transgress identifiable textual limits." 95 It is worth noting that in the concurring opinion, Justice White argued that the case could have been determined on
its merits because "'try' presents no greater, and perhaps fewer, 96interAlpretive difficulties than some other constitutional standards."
though the Court has been clear that it will not take on the
constitutional functions of another branch, as in Gilligan,the Court is
amenable to reviewing the constitutional text to determine the scope
of legislative or executive authority, as in Nixon.
Connected to the textual inquiry of the first factor is the second
Baker criterion-the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards. Although the lack of principled standards can be linked to
the prudential considerations in Coleman v. Miller,9 7 the Court has
used this criterion to support the first Baker factor. For instance, the
Court in Nixon held that the "lack of judicially manageable standards
may strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable
commitment to a coordinate branch."9 8 In finding a lack of "identifiable textual limits" in the Impeachment Clause or in any other constitutional provision, the Court was supported in holding that there were
no limits to the scope of the Senate's authority. 9 9
Despite the fact that the Court has used the second criterion
predominantly to prop up the first criterion, at times the Court has
also used this factor in support of prudential considerations. For instance, the Court has simply argued that the lack of manageable standards makes it prudent to abdicate judicial review. 10 0 Most recently,
the Court has argued that the possibility of judicially discoverable
93. 506 U.S. 224.
94. Id. at 230-33, 238. The constitutional impeachment provision reads in part,
"[tihe Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
95. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 225.
96. Id. at 247 (White, J., concurring) (articulating the general critique that the classical strand of the doctrine is really no different than a decision on the merits); see
infra text accompanying notes 108-12.
97. 307 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1939) (holding that if Congress proposes ratification of an
amendment to the Constitution and does not specify a date for ratification by the
states, only Congress can determine whether ratification is timely); see supra text
accompanying notes 44-45, 69.
98. 506 U.S. at 228-29.
99. Id. at 238.
100. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552-56 (1946).
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standards cannot substitute for the actual articulation of these standards.1O1 In Vieth v. Jubelirer,the Court held that the Constitution
provides no "judicially enforceable limit on the political considerations
that the States and Congress may take into account when districting."10 2 Overturning its earlier decision in Davis v. Bandemer, 0 3 the
Court found that no workable standard had been articulated in the
eighteen years since the decision and, therefore, the Court would not
adjudicate political gerrymandering claims.104
However, the use of this Baker criterion is rare and the Court has
held elsewhere that "a judicial system capable of determining when
punishment is 'cruel and unusual,' when bail is '[e]xcessive,' when
searches are 'unreasonable,' and when congressional action is 'necessary and proper' for executing an enumerated power" is also able to
make ordinary constitutional judgments.105 The Court has also used
the second criterion to establish a prudential rationale for avoiding a
decision on the merits.1O6 Yet, the Court is more apt to identify some
meaning in the constitutional language at issue and to use the second
criterion to show a textual commitment to another branch.107
Although the decision in Powell exhausted significant space to the
discussion of the Baker criteria, in subsequent cases the Court has (1)
simply refuted the applicability of the political question doctrine, (2)
affirmed the Court's authority to interpret the provision, and (3) decided the case on the merits of the issue without much discussion. For
instance, in United States v. Munoz-Flores,1O8 the Court found all six
criteria of the political question doctrine inapplicable and evaluated
the case on its merits in order to determine whether the act in question was a "Bil [1] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause.' 0 9 The Court argued that the interpretation of
statutes and legislative materials was familiar and central to the judiciary and its function.110 Similarly, in JapanWhaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society, the Court held that it had the power to interpret
treaties and executive agreements-in fact, "interpreting congressional legislation is a recurring and accepted task for the federal
101. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004).
102. Id. at 305.
103. 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (finding political gerrymandering claims justiciable but disagreeing on what the standard was for reviewing these claims).
104. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306.
105. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 396 (1990).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
108. 495 U.S. 385 (addressing whether an act requiring federally convicted persons to
pay a special assessment violated the Origination Clause).
109. Id. at 387-88; see also U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442 (1992)
(holding that interpreting the apportionment provisions of the Constitution was
within the competency of the courts).
110. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 395.
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courts."111 Furthermore, the Court found that its decision called for,
"applying no more than the traditional rules of statutory construction,
and then applying this analysis to the particular set of facts presented
below." 1 12 Considering that only three cases have been found to include a political question, it is clear that the Court does not find many
provisions that are textually committed solely to another branch or
devoid of some judicially determinable meaning.
As demonstrated, in the aftermath of Baker, the political question
doctrine evolved into a substantive evaluation of the constitutional
text in question. The first two criteria allowed the Court to evaluate
the text of the relevant provision to determine what limits, if any, to
the political branches' authority were available and, consequently,
whether an act by a political actor was constitutional. This evaluation
marked a significant difference in the use of the classical version of
the doctrine. For instance, in decisions such as Martin v. Mott 1 1 3 and
Luther v. Borden, 114 the Court's rationale in abdicating judicial review was simple: "the inquiry proposed to be made belonged to the
political power and not to the judicial ... it rested with the political
power to decide."11 5 Therefore, whereas the doctrine was previously
used as a threshold for determining whether to engage in judicial review prior to any interpretation of the Constitution, after Baker, the
Court used the doctrine to "interpre[t] the Constitution to say one
thing rather than another.""1 6 The justices engage in judicial review
of the text of the Constitution-interpretation of the text-and, therefore, there is no need to invoke the political question doctrine because
the justices are already determining the meaning of the text. In addition, the last four prudential criteria are virtually ignored, which
places further emphasis on the first two criteria.
2.

The Vitality of the Doctrine After Baker

There are three central reasons that, following Baker, a debate regarding the vitality of the political question doctrine arose. First, the
Court has focused primarily on the first two Baker criteria, while
largely ignoring the last four prudential considerations. 1 1 7 Second, in
the rare case where the Court did find a political question, the Court's
rationale seemed to be a thinly veiled decision on the merits of the
case. l" 8 Finally, the Court was increasingly more confident in assert111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
Id.
25 U.S. 19 (1827).
48 U.S. 1 (1849).
Id. at 39.
Tushnet, supra note 62, at 1206.
Barkow, supra note 11, at 266-73.
See Henkin, supra note 16, at 598-99.
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ing judicial authority in regard to interpretation of a variety of issues,
to the detriment of the doctrine.119
The Court has not explicitly rejected the use of prudential considerations. In fact, the Court has noted prudential considerations in its
decisions concerning political questions.12 0 However, these decisions
have not hinged on Baker's prudential criteria. The Court is more
likely to argue that "one of the Judiciary's characteristic roles is to
interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely be121
Simicause our decision may have significant political overtones."
larly, the Court has held that a judicial determination that a law is
unconstitutional cannot involve the "lack of respect" used in Baker,
because, under this rationale, judicial review in general would be prohibited.122 Although prudential considerations may be taken into account at some point in the future, the doctrine has been effectively
123
limited to the first two criteria.
Central to the debate over the viability of the doctrine is the argument that many, if not all, political question cases rely on substantive
legal conclusions; either (a) the Constitution gives a political branch
discretion to act and that branch has not overstepped this discretion,
or (b) there are no constitutional limits to the political branch's discretion.124 In either case, there is no need to invoke the political question
doctrine when the courts are merely applying "neutral principles of
judicial review."125 The courts are merely going through the motions
of abdicating their authority to review a political actor's decision
rather than actually deferring to the branch in question on procedural
grounds. 1 2 6 Conflating the distinction between substantive and procedural deference is confusing primarily because the courts' intentions
are unclear.12 7 First, if the court has made a decision on the merits, it
has also either condoned or rejected the decision of a political branch.
Second, if the court has found the issue non-justiciable, then it "fore119. See Tushnet, supra note 62, at 1208.
120. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 236 (1993) (discussing problems
associated with the lack of finality and the difficulty of fashioning relief).
121. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
122. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 390 (1990).
123. Tushnet, supra note 62, at 1213.
124. Henkin, supra note 16, at 598-99.
125. See Redish, supra note 5, at 1042.
126. See Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine, 37
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 441, 448 (2004).
127. The decision in Nixon represents substantive deference; the Court could not associate any particular meaning with the word "try" so it deferred to the method the
Senate had devised for impeachment proceedings. Nixon v. United States, 506
U.S. 224, 229-30 (1993). The decision in Luther represents procedural deference;
the Court refused to review the constitutionality of Rhode Island's government,
thereby avoiding any inquiry into the issue. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 46-47
(1849).
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closes a range of potential litigation and signals once and for all that
there is no judicial remedy available for any official misconduct within
a certain area."128 These issues are evident in Nixon, where the Court
argued that "[tihe word try, both in 1787 and later, has considerably
broader meanings than those to which petitioner would limit it,"129
and, therefore, there was no "identifiable textual limit on the authority which is committed to the Senate."130 In effect, Nixon evaluated
whether the Senate abused its discretion and, subsequently, "reject[ed] on the merits Judge Nixon's claim that he had not received a
trial within the meaning of the Impeachment Clause,"131 while maintaining that the political question doctrine was applicable and, thus,
the Court was not evaluating the substance of the petitioner's claim.
Some scholars have argued that the only meaningful political question challenge would arise when a provision was interpreted as selfmonitoring and, thus, not subject to judicial review at all.132 When
faced with a political question challenge, a court would ask, "Who gets
to decide what the right answer to a substantive constitutional question is?"13 3 Thus, the doctrine would only apply when the legislative
or executive branch had complete and final authority to determine the
constitutional meaning of the provision in question. In the alternative, or at the very least, a court would consider whether another
branch could interpret the Constitution as well as the judiciary.134
However, the contemporary Court has not been inclined to recognize limits to its authority in interpreting the Constitution.13 5 The
Court is unlikely to find that a constitutional provision allocates complete interpretational authority to another branch.136 This condition
is evidenced by the Court's reluctance to use the political question doctrine, even when it may be expedient,137 as well as the numerous
cases where the Court has held that the issue is "only an ordinary
question of constitutional interpretation of the sort courts routinely
answer."138 Correspondingly, the Court has reviewed cases involving
due process, equal protection, and free speech, indicating the Court's
willingness to develop standards if there are none readily assessable
in the constitutional language.1 39 The doctrine's viability has been
128. Michael J. Gerhardt, Rediscovering Nonjusticiability: Judicial Review of Impeachments after Nixon, 44 DuKE L.J. 231, 245-46 (1994).
129. 506 U.S. at 229.
130. Id. at 238.
131. Tushnet, supra note 62, at 1211.
132. See Henkin, supra note 16, at 622-23.
133. Tushnet, supra note 62, at 1207.
134. Id. at 1207-08.
135. See Barkow, supra note 11, at 300-19; Nagel, supra note 71, at 659-64.
136. Tushnet, supra note 62, at 1207-08.
137. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
138. Tushnet, supra note 62, at 1208.
139. Redish, supra note 5, at 1046.
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called into question not only because of the Court's self-described status as the "ultimate interpreter" of the Constitution140 but also because of its abdication of prudential concerns and use of the doctrine
in cases where a decision on the merits has occurred. Thus, following
Baker, the use and power of the political question doctrine has waned.
D.

The Political Question Doctrine and the Nebraska
Judiciary

Nebraska Coalition for Educational Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman presented the first case in which the Nebraska Supreme Court
explicitly accepted the political question doctrine. 141 The court held
that the doctrine had previously been "implicitly recognized" in State
ex rel. Steinke v. Lautenbaugh.142 However, the Baker criteria had
not been adopted by the Nebraska Supreme Court at that time.143
Thus, the applicability of the political question doctrine in Coalition
was an issue of first impression.
The Coalitionplaintiffs-which included the forty-three school districts of the Nebraska Coalition for Educational Equity and Adequacy,
two separate school districts, and four individual citizens-challenged
the constitutionality of Nebraska's education funding system.14 4 The
Coalition alleged that the funding system was inadequate and, as
such, violated the religious freedom clause 145 and the free instruction
clause146 of the Nebraska constitution. The Coalition sought
(1) a declaration that Nebraska's [c]onstitution requires "an education which
provides the opportunity for each student to become an active and productive
citizen in our democracy, to find meaningful employment, and to qualify for
higher education; (2) a declaration that Nebraska's education funding system
140. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18
(1958) (holding that the state legislature and governor were bound to obey the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to racial segregation in schools because the "federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution").
141. 273 Neb. 531, 731 N.W.2d 164 (2007).
142. 263 Neb. 652, 642 N.W.2d 132 (2002). Lautenbaugh addressed the issue of
whether the election commissioner exceeded his authority and abused his statutory power. In finding the issue justiciable, the court stated that its determination was simply the proper interpretation of applicable statues and, thus, was not
a political question. Id. at 660, 642 N.W.2d at 139.
143. Coalition, 273 Neb. at 545, 731 N.W.2d at 176.
144. Id. at 535-36, 731 N.W.2d at 169-70.
145. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4. The relevant language of the provision reads, "Religion,
morality, and knowledge, however, being essential to good government, it shall be
the duty of the Legislature to pass suitable laws ... to encourage schools and the
means of instruction." Id.
146. NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1. The language of the provision reads, "The [1legislature
shall provide for the free instruction in the common schools of this state." Id.
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is unconstitutional; and (3) an injunction enjoining state officials from imple14 7
menting the system."

The Coalition's claims were not new. Since the early 1970s, educational funding has been the subject of increased litigation.148 The basis of the Coalition's suit fell in line with the third wave of school
financing litigation, which has focused on the adequacy of the education provided to students by the state. 14 9 Whereas the first two waves
of litigation "sought to reduce spending disparities and focused on
traditional input measures such as per-pupil and overall educational
spending," 150 the third wave challenged the sufficiency of school funding by arguing for a minimal level of education based on the education
clauses in the state constitution.151
Contrary to the success this type of litigation enjoyed in other
states, the district court and the Nebraska Supreme Court found the
Coalition's claims to be a non-justiciable political question.15 2 The
court stated that the primary issue was whether the court could determine the case on the merits "without violating the separation of powers clause,"'153 which prohibits the court "from hearing a matter the
determination of which the [c]onstitution entrusts to another coordinate department." 154 Consequently, the court decided to evaluate this
issue using the Baker criteria. The court held that the Coalition's
claim met four of the Baker tests. There was (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate department, (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving the issue, (3) an impossibility of deciding the issue without making a policy determination clearly requiring non-judicial discretion, and (4) an impossibility of resolving the issue without
147. Coalition, 273 Neb. at 534, 731 N.W.2d at 169.
148. Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the "Third
Wave". From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151 (1995).
149. Id. at 1152-53.
150. Id. at 1153.
151. Id. at 1162-63. In some cases, the state supreme court has effectively invalidated
the existing financing system for the state and required the respective legislature
to reform the entire system. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790
S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
152. Coalition, 273 Neb. at 534, 731 N.W.2d at 164.
153. Id. at 541, 731 N.W.2d at 173; see also NEB. CONST. art. II, § 1 (describing the
separation of powers under the Nebraska constitution).
154. Coalition, 273 Neb. at 545, 731 N.W.2d at 176 (quoting State ex rel. Spire v. Conway, 238 Neb. 766, 773, 472 N.W.2d 403, 408 (1991)). In Spire, the court insinuated that under article III, section 10 of the Nebraska constitution, the
legislature has sole discretion in determining its members' qualifications. Although Spire did not reach the issue of whether the legislature made the correct
determination, if the Nebraska Supreme Court adopted the rationale of Powell,
the legislative determination would be justiciable if another provision of the constitution informs those qualifications.
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disregarding the legislature's exclusive authority.1 55 In addition, the
court advanced its own prudential consideration, finding that "a justi6
ciable issue must be susceptible to immediate resolution."15
The Nebraska Supreme Court's rationale in Coalition provided a
means to avoid the responsibility of deciding the controversial issue of
whether the legislature was providing adequate funding for the state's
school system. This may be a satisfactory result given the continuing
public debate surrounding the issue of educational funding and the
importance of the issue to the general public, which most likely will
continue to prompt legislative action in the area. Additionally, once
the court has found a constitutional right to education and standards
to measure whether that right is violated, then the courts most likely
would be responsible for monitoring compliance with those standards.
Judicial restraint leaves the decision of particular educational standards to the legislature, who in turn, can try different methods to
solve funding deficiencies.
Although this arrangement provides for a greater degree of flexibility in addressing the issue, the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in
Coalition has effectively cut off the option of rehearing the issue to
ensure the legislature meets its constitutional obligation to "encourage schools" and "provide for the free instruction in the common
schools."15 7 This does not seem to be the optimal result practically or
structurally, given the role of the judiciary in reviewing the actions of
the other branches to ensure constitutional conformity. Moreover, following the precedent set by the U.S. Supreme Court, the court did not
abstain from textual interpretation or determine that the final decision of the constitutionality of the issue was given to the legislature.
Instead, the court found the issue non-justiciable based on an interpretation of the text of the relevant constitutional provisions, finding
that the legislature has discretion to act in determining educational
funding. The court could have simply found that the legislature was
acting within its constitutional authority, thereby avoiding the political question doctrine and a decision that places school financing
outside the court's purview.
III.

ANALYSIS

The Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in Coalition is consistent
with both the classical and prudential strands of the political question
doctrine as set forth in Baker. However, the court's decision conflates
155. Coalition, 273 Neb. at 549-56, 731 N.W.2d at 178-83.
156. Id. at 555, 731 N.W.2d at 182; see also Rath v. City of Sutton, 267 Neb. 265, 673
N.W.2d 869 (2004) (explaining that a justiciable issue requires a present controversy that is subject to immediate resolution and capable of judicial
enforcement).
157. See supra notes 145-46.
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the distinction between substantive and procedural deference and confirms that the doctrine, in its diminished state, does little more than
veil a decision on the merits of the claim.
A.

Application of the Baker Criteria-Classical Factors

The first two criteria of the Baker test are the textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a coordinate branch and, in relation,
the lack of judicially manageable standards. 158 In evaluating the first
criterion, the relevant text must be interpreted to determine "whether
and to what extent the issue is textually committed," or, more succinctly, the "scope of authority conferred" upon the political branch. 159
The second criterion, a lack of manageable standards, can "strengthen
the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a
coordinate branch."160
In applying the first criterion, the court argued briefly that "[w]hat
methods and what means should be adopted in order to furnish free
instruction to the children of the state has been left by the constitution
to the [1]egislature."161 In support of this proposition, the court referred back to State ex rel. Shineman v. Board of Education where the
court addressed the issue of whether it had the power to determine
the method the legislature should use when carrying out its constitutional duties.162 In that case, the court left the method of providing
free instruction within the discretion of the legislature. 16 3 Their decision stood for the proposition that the legislature had the responsibility to carry out the function articulated in article VII, section 1 of the
Nebraska constitution. Indeed, the religious freedom clause and the
free instruction clause imbue the legislature with the specific duties
"to pass suitable laws . . .to encourage schools and the means of instruction" and to "provide for the free instruction."164 Although the
constitutional language specifies that the legislature has the responsibility to carry out specific government functions, the issue in Coalition
was whether the text leaves the final responsibility to interpret the
158.
159.
160.
161.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-29 (1993).
Id.
Coalition, 273 Neb. at 542, 731 N.W.2d at 173 (quoting Affholder v. State ex rel.
McMullen, 51 Neb. 91, 93, 70 N.W. 544, 545 (1897)).
162. 152 Neb. 644, 42 N.W.2d 168 (1950).
163. Shineman, 152 Neb. at 647-48, 42 N.W.2d at 170.
164. Article 7, section 1 of the Nebraska constitution reads that the "[1legislature shall
provide for the free instruction in the common schools of this state." NEB. CONST.
art. VII, § 1. Article 1, section 4 reads that "[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge,
however, being essential to good government, it shall be the duty of the
[1legislature to pass suitable laws ... to encourage schools and the means of instruction." NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4.
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scope of that authority with the legislature.165 The court does not address this question, but instead focuses on who has the duty to carry
out the provision. As previously discussed, the courts can still review
the actions of a coordinate branch without taking over the functions of
that branch.16 6 In fact, judicial review is exactly the duty and responsibility of the courts, which was largely ignored in Coalition.
Turning to the second criterion and following the rationale of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Nixon,16 7 the court suggested that this factor
168
may assist in establishing a textually demonstrable commitment.
The court turned to the text of the free instruction clause and the religious freedom clause after finding that there were "no qualitative,
constitutional standards ... apart from the requirements that the education in public schools must be free and available to all children."169
The court argued that changes in the constitutional language from
1866 to 1875 effectively eliminated any qualitative measure of a "thorough and efficient system," and, furthermore, the citizens of Nebraska
had rejected qualitative standards in 1996 in voting against a constitutional amendment that would have incorporated this type of standard.170 Similar to the rationale used in Nixon v. United States, the
court used the absence of qualitative language to argue that the "paucity of standards" in the text of the provision removed any "restrictions or qualitative standards on the [1]egislature's duties regarding
education."'71 In addition, the court dismissed the use of the religious
freedom clause to imbue a qualitative standard on the legislature's
duty to provide free education.17 2 The court argued that the clause
does not "impos[e] an affirmative duty on the [1legislature to encourage schools beyond the establishment of school districts."173 In so
finding, the court found no textual limits on legislative action.
The court's arguments in regard to this element are questionable.
First, it is unclear whether there are standards the court could have
used to determine what the legislature's duty is in regard to education. Although the language of the relevant provisions-"free instruc165. See supra text accompanying note 84.
166. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973); see also supra text accompanying
notes 91-92 (outlining the facts and holding behind Gilligan).
167. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993); supra text accompanying notes
98-99.
168. Neb Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 273 Neb. 531, 549, 731
N.W.2d 164, 178 (2007).
169. Id. at 550, 731 N.W.2d at 179.
170. Id. at 550-52, 731 N.W.2d at 179-80.
171. Id. at 552, 731 N.W.2d at 180.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 552, 731 N.W.2d at 180. Clearly the court has previously interpreted the
religious freedom clause in order to determine that there is a duty to establish
school districts; thus, it would seem that the religious freedom clause is not beyond judicial review.
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tion"174 and "suitable laws ... to encourage schools and the means of
instruction"175 -do not provide an explicit definition, these terms are
no more obtuse than "cruel and unusual"17 6 or "public use,"1 77 which
are terms the court has been able to explicate. In addition, a significant majority of other state supreme courts who have faced the same
issue have determined the issue justiciable and have reviewed the language of their constitutions to determine legislative compliance.17s
Second, it is unclear why the court found it necessary to discuss recent
popular initiatives in determining the constitutional meaning of the
provisions. As the court has suggested elsewhere, "the interpretation
of constitutional language is not a popularity contest."17 9 Lastly, the
constitutional language did not need to have extensive qualitative explanation in order to review the situation of Nebraska schools and the
education students are receiving or to determine whether the educational system is providing "knowledge . . .essential to good government."18 0 The court could have simply answered that the legislature's
funding system was meeting the constitutional requirements.
As discussed earlier, a decision that the Constitution places no limits on the discretion of a political branch is tantamount to a decision
on the merits of the case. 18 ' This is true because the court is "not
abdicating its power to interpret and enforce a constitutional provision rather, it is simply holding that nothing in the Constitution directs the [legislature] as to how to make such determinations." 18 2 The
court is engaging in constitutional interpretation in order to find the
issue exclusively within the legislature's power. Therefore, it could be
argued that the court in Coalition decided the substantive issue of
whether the education funding system violated the constitution by deferring to the legislature's determination of adequacy, but couched
this decision within the political question doctrine which procedurally
174. NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1.

175. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4.
176. See, e.g., State v. Mata, 275 Neb. 1, 745 N.W.2d 229 (2008).
177. See, e.g., Monarch Chem. Works, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 203 Neb. 33, 40-41, 277
N.W.2d 423, 427 (1979).
178. See, e.g., Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746
(Tex. 2005); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y.
2003); Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999). The appellants list 15 states that have found the issue justiciable, while only five states
have refused to review the constitutionality of school funding systems. Brief of
Appellants at 12-14, Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 273
Neb. 531, 731 N.W.2d 164 (2007) (No. S-05-1357).
179. Reply Brief of Appellants at 16, Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 273 Neb. 531, 731 N.W.2d 164 (2007) (No. S-05-1357) (citing Duggan v.
Beermann, 249 Neb. 411, 544 N.W.2d 68 (1996) and Duggan v. Beermann, 245
Neb. 907, 515 N.W.2d 788 (1994)).
180. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4.
181. See supra notes 124-26.
182. Redish, supra note 5, at 1039.
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places the final authority of the issue in the hands of the legislature. 8 3 It may be that the courts will only find a political question
when the other branches are within their constitutional bounds,184
but it is also true that the implications of using the political question
doctrine go much further.
In order to maintain its right to review the legislature's actions in
the future, the court could have reached the same result by engaging
in ordinary constitutional interpretation on the merits. A decision on
the merits would have commenced by evaluating whether the meaning of the free education provision was clear.' 8 5 If the meaning was
unclear, the court could have looked elsewhere "to determine the intent of the framers of the phrase at issue."18 6 As argued by the Coalition, the court could have evaluated the historical meaning of the
language, legislative debates, or a variety of other methods for determining the meaning of the provision.1S7 Instead, judicial review was
conducted by the court under the auspices of the political question doctrine. In addition, the court would not have been alone in deciding the
issue on its merits. As noted above, many states have faced claims
asserting that the education funding system of the state was inadequate and have found the issue justiciable.1SS States with similar constitutional language concerning education have held that the concept
of "education" infers a "sound basic education"18 9 or "the opportunity
for each child to receive a minimally adequate education."190 Thus,
the court clearly could have decided the case on its merits by interpreting "education" in the free education clause to mean something as
innocuous as a "sound basic education," still managed to defer to the
legislature, and maintained the right to review legislative actions in
the future.
As discussed in section II.C.2.,191 when the courts conflate the distinction between substantive and procedural deference, the courts' intentions become unclear. In Coalition,the court held that the issue of
educational adequacy is non-justiciable, and, therefore, has conceded
183. Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 273 Neb. 531, 552, 731
N.W.2d 164, 180 (2007).
184. See Henkin, supra note 16, at 600-01.
185. Pig Pro Nonstock Coop. v. Moore, 253 Neb. 72, 81, 568 N.W.2d 217, 223 (1997).
186. State ex rel. Spire v. Conway, 238 Neb. 766, 776, 472 N.W.2d 403, 409 (1991).
187. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 179, at 43.
188. Id. at 30-32. See supra text accompanying note 179.
189. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 665 (N.Y. 1995).
190. Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 539 (S.C. 1999); see also
Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993) (defining education as generally preparing students intellectually for a mature life); Fair Sch.
Fin. Council of Okla. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987) (determining the meaning of an adequate education by standards set by the state board of education).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 117-40.
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that the free education clause is judicially unenforceable.1 92 As such,
the court holds that the legislature has the exclusive authority to determine the scope of its actions. Not only does this distend the constitutional authority of the legislature in this area, but it also seems at
odds with the role for the modern judiciary.
The court has maintained, and articulated elsewhere, that "the
construction and interpretation of the [Nebraska] [cionstitution is a
judicial function." 193 Although the legislature may "exercise reasonable discretion" in determining its method of carrying out a constitutional duty, the court maintains the right to evaluate "whether
constitutional requirements have been applied."19 4 The court has also
held that actions abusing the meaning of the constitution or evading
the meaning of the constitution are void.19 5 Previously, the court has
not flinched when invalidating a legislative act when the act goes beyond what is reasonable. 196 The court has clearly articulated its right
to review legislative acts to determine if these acts meet constitutional
requirements. Consequently, it seems likely that the court was
merely using the Baker criteria to shield a direct decision on the merits of the case, effectively avoiding the responsibility of legitimizing
the funding decisions of the legislature.
B.

Application of the Baker Criteria-Prudential Factors

The prudential factors used by the court in Coalition include (a)
the impossibility of deciding the issue without making an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion, (b) the impossibility of deciding an issue without showing a lack of respect for
an another branch, and (c) the court's inability to immediately resolve
school funding disputes. Although prudential factors provide the
courts with inherently more flexible justification for refusing judicial
review, it is pertinent to emphasize that only one case decided by the
U.S. Supreme Court since Baker has possibly hinged on prudential
considerations.1 9 7 In addition, once the courts apply the classical factors of Baker to decide a case on its merits, the use of prudential considerations has been thwarted. Thus, in Coalition, the Nebraska
Supreme Court's invocation of the Baker prudential considerations is
192. U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 457-58 (1992).
193. See Pig Pro Nonstock Coop. v. Moore, 253 Neb. 72, 79, 568 N.W.2d 217, 222
(1997); Calabro v. City of Omaha, 247 Neb. 955, 972, 531 N.W.2d 541, 553 (1995).
194. Rogers v. Morgan, 127 Neb. 456, 459-60, 256 N.W. 1, 2 (1934) (quoting State v.
Moorhead, 99 Neb. 527, 156 N.W. 1067 (1916)).
195. State ex rel. Stull Bros. v. Bartley, 41 Neb. 277, 59 N.W. 907 (1894).
196. See, e.g., Neb. Tel. Co. v. State ex rel. Yeiser, 55 Neb. 627, 76 N.W. 171 (1898).
197. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). Although the decision in Vieth could
possibly be attributed to prudential considerations, it is noteworthy that the
Court spent eighteen years trying to come up with a standard before finding that
the issue was a political question.
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largely superfluous because (a) the court had already used the classical portion of the Baker criteria to decide the case on the merits, and
(b) the use of the prudential considerations has largely been dismissed
by the U.S. Supreme Court.198
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has avoided the use of prudential considerations, the justices have certainly not rejected these elements. Consequently, the Nebraska Supreme Court could have relied
solely on prudential considerations in order to avoid a determination
on the merits. In fact, given that the purpose of the doctrine is to
avoid a decision on the merits, the prudential considerations may be a
more probable method for achieving this end. As previously suggested, the use of the first two Baker criteria often results in a decision
on the merits. Therefore, employing prudential considerations would
avoid the difficulties associated with the first two Baker criteria as
well as a decision on the merits. Choosing to use prudential considerations alone might well subject the court to criticism that its decisions
are unprincipled or instrumental;199 however, the benefits associated
with prudential considerations, such as maintaining the court's legitimacy or creating the opportunity for the court and the political
branches to explore solutions to the issue, 20 0 might well outweigh any
criticism the court received.
For instance, although the court's use of the first prudential consideration is unconvincing, the remaining considerations present acceptable rationale for finding the issue non-justiciable. First, the
court addressed whether it was possible to decide the issue without
making a policy determination clearly requiring non-judicial discretion. 20 1 Second, the court held that resolving the issue would disregard the legislature's exclusive authority in regard to fiscal policy
decisions. 20 2 Finally, the court found that its inability to immediately
20 3
resolve the issue made a decision on the merits unwise.
The court's argument in regard to the first prudential consideration is not convincing. Simple constitutional analysis would most
likely have produced a standard that implied the legislature was act198. Although the Nebraska Supreme Court certainly is not required to use the same
rationale or parameters as the U.S. Supreme Court given the fundamentally different role that state supreme courts play, the Nebraska Supreme Court chose to
use the precedent set by Baker and its progeny, and, thus, the development of the
doctrine in that arena is implicated.
199. See Wechsler, supra note 56, at 14 (arguing that the judicial process must be
principled and not subject to political demands resulting from popular demands).
200. See BICKEL, supra note 7, at 70-71, 239-40.
201. Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 273 Neb. 531, 553-54, 731
N.W.2d 164, 181 (2007); see also Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d
1178, 1191 (1996) (defining what constitutes a quality education should be decided by public debate).
202. Coalition, 273 Neb. at 554-55, 731 N.W.2d at 181-82.
203. Id. at 555-56, 731 N.W.2d at 182-83.
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ing within the limits set out by the relevant constitutional provisions
in providing free education. The court did not need to determine "the
proper means of financing schools" 20 4 and was only asked to decide
whether the legislature had met its duty to provide free instruction
and to pass suitable laws to encourage schools. The court could have
used numerous sources of evidence in conducting their review of the
language of the provisions in question. If not the historical context
surrounding the drafting of the provisions, then state statutes, regulations, teacher certification standards, teacher certification test results, principal ratings of teachers, class size specifications, library
20 5
book ratios, and student proficiency standards could be used.
Therefore, the court's reluctance to interpret the text of the constitution must be tied to its reluctance to decide "yes" or "no" in regard to
school financing.
The last two considerations fall closely in line with the concerns
articulated by Bickel.206 First, the court found that a determination
of inadequate funding would in turn implicate prior funding decisions
by the legislature. 20 7 The court argued that it could not evaluate the
issue without disregarding the legislature's authority in regard to fiscal issues. 20 8 This is most likely true. However, a detailed analysis of
the constitutional provisions at issue would hardly seem unusual or
disrespectful for a court. 20 9 Clearly, Bickel's influence can be seen as
the court attempts to sidestep direct confrontation with the legislative
branch. Correspondingly, the third and final prudential consideration
used in Coalition was the inability of the court to resolve the school
funding dispute, which seems to be a consideration of the court's own
making. Referring to the "Stygian swamp"210 where many states
have found themselves, the court emphasized the necessity of avoiding
the continuous litigation that plagues many courts which have agreed
204. Id. at 541, 731 N.W.2d at 173.
205. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003); see
also Reply Brief of Appellants, supra note 180, at 17-18 (arguing statutes and
regulations can play an evidentiary role in determining whether or not an adequate education is being provided).
206. BICKEL, supra note 7, at 69-70, 130-32. Whereas much legislation is "evanescent, and meant to be," judicial decisions can have effects that carry into several
generations. Id. at 130-31. Bickel argues that when the Court does not act, it is
not abandoning principle but "engag[ing] the Court in a Socratic colloquy with
the other institutions of government and with society as a whole concerning the
necessity for this or that measure, for this or that compromise." Id. at 70-71.
207. Coalition, 273 Neb. at 554-55, 731 N.W.2d at 181-82.
208. Id.
209. See Henkin, supra note 16, at 600.
210. The Stygian swamp is a reference to Greek mythology and the Stygios-a "wild
and awful place" according to Plato-that feeds the River Styx, which surrounds
Hades. PLATO, PHAEDO 183 (Reginald Hackforth trans., Cambridge University
Press 1st ed. 1955).
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to evaluate the adequacy of the state's educational system. 2 11 Both of
these considerations are prudent and would provide the court, before
determining the issue of education funding on its face, with the opportunity to "elicit partial answers and reactions from the other institutions, and to try tentative answers itself."212 Therefore, the court's
deference to the legislature may well have been wise given the current
volatility of the issue within the political halls of Nebraska.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is a thin line between reaching a decision on the merits of a
case when a branch has extensive discretion and abdicating review of
a branch's decision because it is outside the courts' purview. 21 3 This
difficulty is evident in the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in Coalition. As shown in Coalition, the political question doctrine creates a
circular dilemma in its application. A court first invokes the doctrine
in order to avoid judicial review. However, in applying the first two
criteria of Baker, a court effectively engages in constitutional interpretation and makes a decision on the merits of the case. Any use of prudential considerations once the constitutional issue has been resolved
is superfluous, as the purpose of invoking the doctrine has already
been frustrated. Although the idea of the political question doctrine is
still viable, the application of the Baker criteria has largely reduced
the power of the doctrine. The Nebraska Supreme Court would have
been wiser to rely entirely on prudential considerations and avoid the
circular logic inherent in the application of the first two Baker criteria.

211. Coalition, 273 Neb. at 555-57, 731 N.W.2d at 182-83.
212. BICKEL, supra note 7, at 240.
213. Gerhardt, supra note 128, at 245.

